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50X1-HUM

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at the Defense Ministry Labor Party meeting, a resolution was adopted and later forwarded to all North Korean Air Force Units under the name of KIM Kwang Hyop (Minister of Defense) urging all North Korean Armed Forces to be completely prepared for combat [redacted] This information was transmitted to the Armed Forces by the North Korean Army newspaper. [redacted] 50X1-HUM
[redacted] detailed study began in all North Korean Air Force units on how to attack and destroy atomic gun, and missile sites were also studied, however locations of these sites in South Korea were not mentioned. [redacted] the 50X1-HUM
North Korean Air Force underwent air maneuver with aircraft from all divisions and regiments participating. Object of the maneuvers was to block imaginary bombers entering North Korea under heavy fighter plane protection, and training on how to attack sea going vessels. [redacted] command of the Civil Aviation 50X1-HUM
Bureau was turned over to the North Korean Air Force so that the government could maintain a closer control. Pilots and ground maintenance personnel discharged from the North Korean Air Force in early 1960 have been recalled to active duty and placed on duty with the Civil Aviation Bureau for servicing and flying the five civilian aircraft assigned to the Civil Aviation Bureau. All schedules previously serviced were cancelled since the North Korean Air Force has taken command, only scheduled flights [redacted] still existing 50X1-HUM
is the Pyongyang to Chita (Russia). Pilots in flight training after two flights in the YAK-18 are then given training in the MIG-17. [redacted]

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AA weapons were brought into North Korea from Russia. They are supposed to be 100 mm automatic-type sighted by means of radar. Aircraft now in possession of the Civil Aviation Bureau total five, types being YAK-11, YAK-18, C-47, others unknown. The 57 Regiment, 3rd Division received MIG-17 early 1960. (Number unknown). All North Korean Air Force stationed in Manchuria were moved back into North Korea in mid-1959, including the Air Academy in Yenchi. New propaganda line is for the North Korean people to prepare themselves to support the South Korean people. Everybody should produce more commodities which will be needed for support of the South Korean people. KIM, Il Song proposed to shorten the five year Economic Plan to a three year period and during this period produce more consumption commodities.

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The regiment is composed of MIG-15's and IL-28's. 16 aircraft from Wonsan airfield are kept on alert status from sunrise to sunset each day. 8 of the alert aircraft belong to the 26 Regiment and 8 belong to the 56 Regiment. They are relieved from alert status during the night hours by the 58 Regiment at Sondok airfield. Preparations to take over the alert are made during a one hour period prior to sunrise. Switch in the units responsible for maintaining the alert is coordinated by the 2nd Division command post at Sondok airfield. Coordination is accomplished by phone. An auxiliary command post is located at Wonsan. All of the above mentioned aircraft must be airborne within ten minutes of the time that the alert is sounded. Four of the aircraft must be airborne within two minutes. Two of the four aircraft must be airborne and at a 25 meter altitude within one minute and 25 seconds. Pilots selected for alert duty are notified one day in advance by regimental administration. Pilots did not take their aircraft off until they were notified to do so. Unless they receive instructions they sat at ready until instructed to take off or the alert was cancelled. The duty officer notified other command posts in North Korea about the flight plan of aircraft scheduled to fly. Aircraft are also under radar surveillance.

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When an alert is sounded pre-set frequency channel amplifiers are placed in aircraft. Pilots select pre-designated channels.

A team from the North Korea Defense Ministry went to Wonsan airfield for a one month period . It was headed by a Lt General KIM, Bong Yol (Deputy Defense Minister) and consisted of Army and Air Force representatives (Air Force representative was Lt Colonel PANG Chae Song). Purpose of the visit was to inspect and instruct Wonsan personnel (In: a combat readiness test). Any discrepancies noted by the team were immediately corrected.

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The North Korea Air Force Division Command Posts are operated by approximately 15 personnel who are headed by a captain. These personnel are from the Division Communication Battalion. command posts were subordinate to radar units.

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Wonsan Airfield has facilities for overhauling aircraft on the 100 hour inspection level. Major overhauling is accomplished at Sinuiju. North Korean Air Force Fighter Divisions consists of two or three regiments each and are dispersed over two or three airfields. Type of aircraft and number of each in the North Korean Air Force: MIG-15 - eight or nine; MIG-15-BIS - 180 to 207; MIG-17 - five - BIS-LIMA - 12; MIG-15 - 20; MIG-17 - 198 to 225; Item LIMA - 28 - forty; item LIMA - 28 - LIMA - 9; AN-2 - 7 or 8; YAK-18 - number unknown; YAK-12 - 4; Item LIMA - 14 - 1; LIMA ITEM - 2 - 6. The 60 North Korean Air Force Regiment is to receive MIG-19 in place of MIG-17 that they now have. Pilots of the regiment have completed classroom study.

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North Korean Air Force morale was good. the majority of the North Korean Air Force pilots were pro-communist. the North Korean peoples relations with the Chinese Communists and Soviets was friendly. Soviet personnel who were assigned to the North Korean Air Force Headquarters as Engineering and Aviation Advisors They were civilian clothes but were military.

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(coordinates unknown), Pukchang (coordinates unknown), Chongjin (coordinates unknown), Unggi (coordinates unknown) and an unknown place along the West coast of North Korea. Radars are of two types, the PAPA-20 and the PAPA-8. The PAPA-20's are at Kalma Pando, Sendok, Chuam-san and at the aforementioned unknown place along the West coast of

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North Korea. The PAPA-20's have a maximum range of approximately 400 kilometers with an area of coverage extending between 500 meters and 15,000 meters. Area of coverage can be brought down to ground level if the reflector angle of elevation is lowered. The PAPA-8's are located at the remaining areas mentioned above. They have a maximum range of approximately 150 kilometers to 200 kilometers with coverage extending from ground level up to an unknown height. both radar types were used in conjunction with 50X1-HUM each other during GCI activities with the PAPA-8 type transmitting its data 50X1-HUM to one of the PAPA-20's. In turn all radar relay data either to the PAPA-20 at Chuam-san or the PAPA-20 at Sondok. both type radars could perform EW or GCI functions. The PAPA-8 radar at Wonsan airfield is used only during periods of long range navigation training (if the aircraft goes out of the PAPA-8 range it is picked up by the PAPA-20). During periods of minor flying activities the PAPA-20 type radars at Kalma Pando and Sondok alternate shutting down for several hours at a time but during periods of heavy flying activity they both stay in continuous operation. Sondok, Kalma Pando and Wonsan airfield radars are checked, overhauled and repaired each April and November of the year the time at which 50X1-HUM all other North Korean radars received this service.

an IL-28-L aircraft had electronic equipment which could black out radar returns thus concealing their position from radar and automatic AAA. 50X1-HUM all bombers had such electronic equipment. IL-28 pilots are the most experienced pilots the North Korean Air Force has. At the critique of the above maneuvers the crew of an IL-28-L was 50X1-HUM criticized for using their electronic equipment on a radar site location unknown). the officer on duty at the radar site could have alleviated the situation by pushing a button but he became confused. An electronic equipment manufacturing factory is located at Taean (coordinates unknown). It produces four tube radios for the civilian market, electric light bulbs and transformers. all electronic testing equipment used by the North Korean Air Force was manufactured in the U.S.S.R. 50X1-HUM

6. air-borne equipment: Navigational aids - (1) Each aircraft had two compasses, one was an automatic radio compass and the other was either the KU-11 model compass or a DTMK-5 model compass, (2) radio, (3) altimeter (4) speedometer, (5) a watch (6) one; 500,000 map which depicted lakes and an up-to-date layout of North Korea railroad tracks, (7) a plastic triangular ruler with a compass at the center and a centimeter scale along the sides for measuring short map distances, (8) a slide rule, and (9) a measuring device for measuring long map distances: Fire control - the MIG-17-PF has a radar sighting mechanism that picks up aircraft at a five or six kilometer distance. The pilot sights in on an aircraft by looking into a radar scope and manuevering so that he places the radar image of the aircraft on the scope's cross hairs. These aircraft are directed to their targets by the Air Control Center and remain under the control center's direction until they are within 500 meters of their target. Air Control Center informs the pilot when to fire his guns; Blind bombing - IL-28's are equipped with radar to perform blind bombing missions. They have simulated and live bombing practice at a bombing range near Yonggang (coordinates unknown) 50X1-HUM all MIG-17's and an unknown number of MIG-15-BISONS had tail warning radar. The detecting apparatus was the size of a small microphone and was located below the tail light on the vertical stabilizer at a point ten to fifteen centimeters belo- 50X1-HUM

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the horizontal stabilizer. It has a four to five kilometer range. Pilot is notified of a pursuing aircraft's presence by a squealing noise that grows louder as the range between the aircraft closes. 50X1-HUM

the apparatus works on the principle of inducting electrical waves whenever an aircraft is near Switch on the left hand side of the cockpit activates the apparatus. 7. Type of aircraft and the number of each in the North Korean Air Force: MIG-15 - one battalion of eight or nine aircraft. This battalion is subordinate to the five division North Korean Air Force. These aircraft are powered by the RUD-45 engine. MIG-15-BISON - 180 to 207. Based on 35 or 36 being assigned to the North Korean Air Force Air Academy and 6 regiments of three battalions each being equipped with them. each battalion had from 8 to 9 50X1-HUM aircraft assigned to it.

This type aircraft is powered by the VK-1A engine. MIG-15-BISON-LIMA - estimated total of 12 aircraft. All assigned to one battalion. U MIG-15 total 20. Four are assigned to each division (four divisions in the North Korean Air Force) and four assigned to the Air Academy. This aircraft is a two seat trainer. MIG-17 - 198 to 225 total. Based on 6 regiments with an estimated average of 33 to 35 aircraft in each. IL-28 - estimated 25 to 40 aircraft total. One company of this type aircraft has a TO&E strength of 3 aircraft. IL-28-L - 50X1-HUM the North Korean Air Force had 8 or 9 of this type aircraft. AN-2 - 7 or 8. YAK-18 - number unknown. YAK-4. IL-14-1. IL-2-6. Specifically the North Korean Air Force has thirty five to forty bombers and 15 all weather aircraft. The bombers are the above mentioned IL-28's and are assigned to Uiju airfield; the all weather aircraft are MIG-17PF's and are assigned 5 each to the 58 Regiment at Sondok airfield, the 59 Regiment at Sunchon Airfield and the 61 Regiment at Hwangju Airfield. No aircraft in North Korea newer than the FRESCO and BEAGLE. 9. the North Korean Air Force 60 50X1-HUM Regiment is to receive MIG-19 to replace the MIG-17 that they have at present. pilots had already completed class room study of the MIG-19.

the North Korean peoples relations with the Chinese Communists and Soviets was friendly.

A photo reconnaissance regiment is located at Sunan Airfield. The Regiment is composed of MIG-15 and IL-28's.

17. the North Korean Air Force morale was good on the whole, being at its highest among the pilots and being lowest among the enlisted men. Pay was considered good by the pilots and engineers but not too good by the enlisted personnel. Food was considered to be good by the enginners and pilots who received five hundred grams of rice for less than one North Korean won but it was considered poor by ground personnel who received only three hundred grams for less than one North Korean won. Ground personnel with dependents experienced difficulty in getting along on the food ration. Personnel were not satisfied with the length of time they were permitted 50X1-HUM leisure activities. For enlisted personnel leisure time amounted to 30 minutes a day.

the majority of the North Korean Air Force pilots were pro-communist. 18. the

majority of the North Korean people disliked the U.S. [redacted] the dislike was the result of 15 years of constant indoctrination. 19. [redacted] the NKPL issued a bulletin concerning peaceful re-unification of Korea. The Bulletin was published through all news media. The bulletin said that an effort must be made to unite the fatherland as soon as possible. It said North Korea had attempted to send representatives to South Korea for discussions but the South Korean government would not permit them in. The bulletin said that all U.S. troops must leave South Korea and that then representatives from North Korea and South Korea would then meet in either Pyongyang or Seoul and discuss means by which the cabinets of both sides could be combined. The bulletin said that was to be the first step in the unification. After the combination of cabinets the second step would be to have a free interchange of propaganda from both sides. Subsequent to the second step the bulletin said a Korea wide free election would be held. The bulletin said that the free interchange of propaganda would result in everyone learning the truth and electing the North Korean sponsored government.

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[redacted] CP's) are in a sub-surface installation, at [redacted] Second Division), at Hwangju (coordinates unknown) (operated by the North Korean Air Force Third Division) and at Kaechon (coordinates unknown) (operated by the North Korean Air Force Fifth Division), [redacted] the three six Bomber Regiment at Uiju operated a control center [redacted] The control center at Chuam-san is at North Korean Air Force Headquarters level. The remaining control centers mentioned above are at division level. [redacted] the Division level control centers transmit their data to the Chuam-san control center so that in the event anything happens to one of the division control centers the center at Chuam-san can take over its function.

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[redacted] the Second Division having an alternate control center [redacted] all other above mentioned divisions had alternate centers too. [redacted] in the Second Division Control Center [redacted] approximately 15 personnel. Two personnel were observed working as a team in directing the flight of North Korean Air Force aircraft. The first man on the team plotted the courses and positions of aircraft. The second man on the team looked over the shoulder of the first man and by radio, relayed to the aircraft pilots, the information which the first man on the team had plotted. The first man wore a head set through which he received telegraphic transmissions of aircraft course and position data from a P-20 radar site. A third person worked on a map and charted "enemy" aircraft (aircraft in South Korea) locations. He received information in the same manner that the first member of the team mentioned above did. The map this man had was marked with a 360 degree circle which was centered on Sondok. It was this man's responsibility to keep track of "enemy aircraft" and notify alert pilots if any approached within several kilometers of the demilitarized zone. If any aircraft crossed the demilitarized zone he was to send up alert aircraft. Remaining personnel received reports from P-8 type radar sites and visual ground observers. A Captain was in charge of the control center. His job was supervisory. The alternate control center at Wonsan Airfield was staffed by 5 or 6 personnel. [redacted] the alternate control center received the same radar reports that the division control center received but not the reports of visual observers. [redacted] in the event something happened to the division control center the alternate control center

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would take over.

though both types of radar can be used for ground control approach the P-20 sees primary use and the P-8 alternate use with the North Korean Air Force.

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due to errors on the part of ground control approach operators four aircraft were lost last year. there was fifty meters difference in altitude between the operators altitude reading of the aircraft and the aircraft altimeter reading. Two operators who were responsible for the above crashes were put on trial, one was sentenced to death and shot and the other was given a 20 year sentence. Ground control approach operator instructions to pilots are tape recorded. Ground control approach operater for Wonsan Airfield and Sondok Airfield is at Sondok Airfield in the control center.

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ground control approach is primarily used during bad weather.

two radio beacons, one located four hundred meters off the end of the runway and one 4,400 meters off the end of the runway are used in conjunction with ground control approach to get the aircraft lined up with the runway when on its let down and landing. Ground control approach operators turn control of the aircraft back over to the pilots at altitudes ranging between eight hundred meters and thirty-fifty meters depending on the weather. When released it is up to the pilot to complete the landing. The control center notifies the control tower operator when an aircraft is going to land. It is the control tower operator's responsibility to send the aircraft around again if the approach is incorrect. Sunan, Mirim and Uiju Airfields were equipped for ground control approach after the Korean Armistice (date unknown). Wonsan was equipped during 1956. Sondok during 1957, and Pukchang and Hwangju Airfields at an unknown date. instructions from North Korean Air Force Headquarters that instructed units at Sunchon and Kaechon Airfields unit at Kunong Airfield was included) to undertake ground control approach training.

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those airfields also had the capability of handling ground control approach operations. 8. Air Order of Battle Wonsan Airfield: Units at Wonsan Airfield, with exception to the 56 AAA Regiment (listed under Defense), are subordinate to the North Korean Air Force Second Division which is commanded by Senior Colonel AN Yong Kuk and located at Wonsan Airfield. Air units:

UNIT	TYPE AIRCRAFT	NUMBER	COMMANDER
26th Regiment	MIG-15-BIS (Day Pursuit)	27	Unknown
First Battalion	MIG-15-BIS (Day Pursuit)	9	Maj KIM, Song Kak
Second Battalion	MIG-15-BIS (Day Pursuit)	10	Cpt CHOE, Pong Nak
Third Battalion	MIG-15-BIS (Day Pursuit)	8	Maj CHOE, Chol Chang
Security Squad:	Honor Guard for the Regimental colors.		
56th Regiment	MIG-17	Total 32	Unknown
First Battalion	MIG-17 (Day Fighter)	Unknown	Cpt Name Unknown
Second Battalion	MIG-17 (Day Fighter)	Unknown	Maj SIM, Hung Hwan
Third Battalion	MIG-17 (Day Fighter)	Unknown	Maj CHOE, Ki Song

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Security Squad: Assigned to the Regiment for the purpose of guarding the Regimental colors and an honorary flag which was presented to the regiment for its action during the defense of Pyongyang.

Communications Platoon: Responsible for the maintenance and repair of telephones, radios and radio beacons that are used in conjunction with ground control approach. This platoon does not work on airborne communications equipment. It is headed by an unidentified junior lieutenant.

UNIT	MISSION OR PURPOSE
5th Base Unit	
Vehicle Control Company	Motor pool has 70 vehicles. By type and number they are: (1) 20 each fuel supply tank trucks, (2) 15 each lubricating oil tank trucks, (3) unknown number of GAZ-51 tow trucks which are also used as buses, (4) 2 each jeeps, (5) 5 each radio vans, (6) 1 each ambulance, (7) 6 each jet starter units, and (8) 4 each oxygen trucks.
Security Company	Airfield security. Company consisted of 70 each personnel headed by a lieutenant, name unknown.
Hospital	For base personnel. Staffed by 5 or 6 docters and 10 each nurses. Has a 30 to 40 in-patient capacity.
Management Platoon	Performs maintenance on the airfield proper. Composed of 30 each personnel and headed by a Junior Lieutenant, name unknown.
Material Section	Performs maintenance on all aircraft, instruments and parts. Headed by a Captain, name unknown.
Fuel Section	Provides fuel for aircraft and vehicles.
Rear Services	Supply food, clothes and quarters.
Compression Center	Store and supplies oxygen and air.
Battery Shop	Maintains and supplies aircraft and vehicle batteries.
Division Repair Shop	Has facilities for overhauling and repairing aircraft up to and including a 100 hour inspection.
Detection Company	Has the mission of operating two search radars.
Search Light Company	Has the mission of operating two automatic tracking searchlights.

AAA Defense

UNIT	TYPE WEAPON	NUMBER OF GUNS	COMMANDER
56th AAA Regiment	100mm AAA (Automatic Radar)		LTC Name unknown

UNIT	TYPE WEAPON	NUMBER OF GUNS	COMMANDER
First Company	100mm AAA (Automatic Radar)	4 to 6	CPT Name unknown
Second Company	100mm AAA (Automatic Radar)	4 to 6	CPT Name unknown
Third Company	100mm AAA (Automatic Radar)	4 to 6	CPT Name unknown
Fourth Company	100mm AAA (Automatic Radar)	4 to 6	CPT Name Unknown
Fifth Company	100mm AAA (Automatic Radar)	4 to 6	CPT Name unknown
Sixth Company	100mm AAA (Automatic Radar)	4 to 6	CPT Name unknown

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14. North Korean Air Force aircraft accidents: the First, Third, and Fourth Divisions probably had about as many accidents as are listed for the Second Division

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WHERE	UNIT	TYPE ACCIDENT	AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
Yenchi	Air Academy	Mid-air collision	Two YAK-11's
Choyangchon (China)	Third Battalion Air Academy	Lost Consciousness During maneuvers	MIG-15-BIS
Hoemun	Third Battalion Air Academy	Engine Stalled, Hit dike	UMIG-15
Sinuiju	56 Regiment Second Division	Mid-air collision	Two LA-9's
Mirim	58th Regiment 2d Division	Air pocket, hit mountain	UMIG-15 2 men
Wonsan & Sondok	26th Regiment Second Division	Mid-air collision	2 MIG-15-BIS
	58th Regiment Second Division	Could not pull out of dive	1 MIG-17
Yongdok	56th Regiment Second Division	Mislead by GCA operator	UMIG-15
Yongdok	56th Regiment Second Division	Did not trust instruments. Did not listen to CB?	MIG-17
Mirim	26th Regiment Second Division	Too fast approach, hit tree	MIG-15-BIS
Changjin-Ho Wake	58th Regiment Second Division	GCA operator fault	MIG-17
Sunchon	25th Regiment First Division	Mid-air collision	Two MIG-15-BIS
Pukchang	60th Regiment First Division	Pilot lost too much altitude. Hit mountain	MIG-17
Mirim	57th Regiment Third Division	Flight test went too fast, too low. Pilot error.	MIG-15-BIS

WHERE	UNIT	TYPE ACCIDENT	AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
Uiju	56th Regiment Fourth Division	Pilot error, did not believe instruments. Hit mountain.	IL-28

15. North Korean Air Force Doctrine: Tactical in nature. First priority targets are air fields, second priority ground support and third interdiction. [redacted] In 50X1-HUM support of ground forces the first objective was air superiority after which the pilot acted according to the situation. Important targets that had been destroyed are to have visual or photo reconnaissance missions run against them regularly to determine if reconstruction or repair is occurring. In the event such a target is being reconstructed or repaired it will be bombed again. The primary target for a fighter plane after airfields is a convoy. The North Korean Air Force principle of attacking a convoy is to bomb the lead and rear before attacking the center. Within a convoy the first priority is POL. 50X1-HUM 16. Supplies for training: Fuel supply unknown. [redacted] one five rounds 50X1-HUM of 25 mm ammunition are issued to a fighter pilot for each type of firing practice he receives. This includes both fast and slow firing. [redacted] the average number of hits on simulated F-86 and B-47 type targets is 6 out of 15. In the event a pilot fails to get a passing score the first time he must refire. If he fails the second time, he is given a failing mark in that type firing and passes on to the next type training. Pilots do not get the opportunity to practice fire 57 mm rounds because it is too expensive. Each fighter pilot receives bombing training. They each drop two fifty kilograms practice bombs as part of their training. Prior to dropping his bombs, each pilot makes a simulated bomb drop using a nose camera to determine his accuracy. [redacted] 50X1-HUM thought bombers used live bombs during part of their training. 20. North Korean Air Force personnel are receiving only defensive radiological chemical training. [redacted] The 50X1-HUM defensive nuclear training concerns the protection of personnel and aircraft from an atomic bomb blast and the chemical training concerns the protection of personnel from gas and the decontamination of an area. 21. [redacted] 50X1-HUM [redacted] the North Korean government claimed it did not need and did not have nuclear weapons. Reason for not needing nuclear weapons was said to be that 50X1-HUM if another war broke out it would not be a limited one but take in the whole world and be fought between the east and west with rockets. 22. [redacted] the North Korea early warning net was good. The only weak point in the North Korean Radar system was on the North Korea mainland in the Diamond Mountain area between Kosong and Chorwon. [redacted] the mountains in that area stopped radar beams disallowing full coverage. Radars are supplemented with visual ground observers in the mountainous areas. [redacted] aircraft fuel was primarily brought into North Korea by rail across the Tumen river. [redacted]

It is a sub-surface installation. 2. Sunan, Mirim, Uiju, Wonsan, Sondok, Pukchang and Hwangju airfields have ground control approach systems. 3. The 58 Regiment at Sondok airfield has 5 MIG-17PF all weather fighters. 4. All MIG-17's and some MIG-15-BISONS are equipped with a tail warning radar. 5. North Korean Air Force pilots have recently been instructed to delay their approach on aircraft flying in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone. Purpose of this delay is to allow the South Korea side aircraft to cross into North Korea. Pilots are to further entice such aircraft deeper into North Korea by pretending to flee. At the proper time the pilots were told to get behind the South Korean side aircraft, follow a pursuit course and fire at the signal of the control center. A slogan used in conjunction with these instructions was "don't be cheated". 6. President Eisenhower's plane was tracked by North Korean radar on his recent visit to Republic of Korea. 7. Ground control approach operator errors have caused four North Korean Air Force planes to crash during the last year. 8. Wonsan airfield has underground fuel storage tanks. 9. the pilots in the regiment that is charged with the defense of Pyongyang have volunteered to fly their airplanes into any matador missiles launched at Pyongyang.

Normal navigation instructions are given to the pilot by the division CP on radio channel number 2. However, in the event a pilot gets lost he utilises a pre-designated emergency radio channel to contact a navigation facility. Contact is made by calling out the code word of the navigational facility on which the pilot desires a course heading and giving his aircraft number. The emergency channel is changed daily and the code word for the navigational facility every five days. Navigational facilities locate lost aircraft with a pelengator (direction finder) which points out the direction from which the radio transmission is coming. The pilot is then given the directional heading he must take to reach the navigational facility. radio frequencies they were pre-set. Boxes containing frequency settings were placed into the aircraft before flight and removed afterwards. The boxes were maintained by the classified document section. Aircraft radios have four channels. 2. At Wonsan airfield four aircraft are on strip alert. The pilots stay on strip alert for the period extending from one hour before daylight to one hour after sundown. Only pilots with approximately one year flying time (or more) pull strip alert. 3. Flight schedules are passed between stations by the division control center by radio communication.

POL as having come from Baku, U.S.S.R. With exception to rubber brake cylinders for aircraft tires that are manufactured both in the U.S.S.R. and North Korea. all parts used came from U.S.S.R. This brake cylinder is called "Yunchae" in the Korean language. at the North Korean Air Force Air aircraft with tires that were manufactured in China the above mentioned tires were manufactured near Peking, China. All North Korean Air

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Force aircraft come from the U.S.S.R. They arrive in North Korea dis-assembled. Assembly takes place at Pyongyang. Means of transportation to North Korea unknown. 5. Alerts begin when a flare (color is changed daily) is shot in the air. At this time two pilots who are already sitting in their aircraft, suited and helmeted, put on their oxygen masks. While the pilots are doing this a technician standing on a ladder at the side of the cockpit switches on starting switches. When the aircraft is started either the pilot or the technician calls out to a man at the starting battery to unplug. (Battery plugged in during entire period of alert). The technician then takes down the ladder and the pilot closes the cockpit also begining his taxi onto the runway from the alert ramp which is located adjacent to the end of the runway. At the runway the control tower operator gives the code word "light" and the pilots start their take off run. Pilots must be airborne and at a 25 meter altitude before 1.5 minutes have elapsed. No communications checks are made during period of alert but the pilot must constantly monitor messages coming over his earphones (the control tower operator makes spot checks to test pilots wakefullness). All communications checks are made by techhicians one hour before the standby alert begins. In the event the alert is cancelled while the aircraft are still on the ground the control tower operator notifies the pilots by telling them to make a 180 degree turn which signifies the alert is over. The control tower operator has no authority to cancel an alert without notification from the division control center or a higher headquarters. Simultaneously with this activity, two other alert pilots who are not required to sit in the aircraft (but must always be within the near vicinity of their aircraft) run to their planes and repeat the same process described for the first two alert pilots. The latter two pilots must be airborne and at a 25 meter altitude within two minutes. [redacted] 6. Step by step 50X1-HUM
procedure for GCI: After getting airborne and reaching a 25 meter altitude the pilot calls out the code word for the division CP and relays his aircraft number. He then says the code words "motor number two" and switches his radio from channel number one to channel number two. The division control center switches to channel number two simultaneously with the pilot and the operator repeats the code words "motor number two". Along with the above, the pilot also charges his guns and switches on a semi-automatic sighting mechanism. After the channel switch is made the division control center operator takes over direction of the aircraft, instructing the pilot what altitude, heading, and speed he should maintain. After changing radio channels the pilot does not speak again until he has sighted his target. At that time he says "I have sighted the enemy, may I shoot?" [redacted] the control center 50X1-HUM
at North Korean Air Force Headquarters level monitored all aircraft radio transmissions and [redacted] if they wished to take over control from the division 50X1-HUM
control center they called out a code word which transferred control to them. The division control center stops transmitting as soon as the code word is said. The code word is changed daily. The division control center maintains continuous verbal contact with the aircraft even if the pilot is following instructions exactly. During exercises, aircraft work in pairs, one simulates enemy, the other friendly. Step by step procedure for navigation exercises, they are (1) navigation of a pre-planned course, and (2) blind navigation. Neither of the two exercises takes place without an escort aircraft whose pilot is responsible for grading the ability of the pilot taking the exercise. At a briefing that takes place before the exercise pilots are given the code words to use in raising a navigational facility. The latter type navigational exercise differs from the former in that the pilot does not know the course he is to fly. Both types of exercises are the same as that for GCI except for the continuous verbal contact that takes place during GCI exercises and the pilot's announcement that he has sighted the enemy. During navigational

exercises communication is not continuous. Gunnery exercises: Direction given to the aircraft and communication is the same as procedure given for GCI. For live gunnery exercises ground targets that are silhouettes of the F-86 and B-47 are used. For simulated exercises two aircraft are sent aloft as a team, one aircraft simulating an enemy aircraft and the other a friendly. Cameras are used to score pilots. 7. 50X1-HUM 25X1 all non-alert aircraft flights must be forwarded there prior to the flight. the combat operations center was subordinate to the operations section, North Korean Air Force Headquarters, because the schedules had to be routed through that section. 8. The MIG-17PF is equipped with nose and tail radars. All other MIG-17 and an unknown number of MIG-15BIS are equipped with tail warning radar. The nose radar in the MIG-17PF has a maximum range of 12 kilometers but is usually used at 5 or 6 kilometers distances. it was very accurate but unable to give figures. 50X1-HUM Accuracy increases as distance from the target decreases. The tail warning radar had a range of 4 or 5 kilometers. any aircraft flying to 50X1-HUM the rear of it was picked up and the pilot notified by a squealing sound that grew progressively louder as the range between aircraft decreased. North Korean Air Force IL-28 and IL-28L bomber aircraft are equipped with blind bombing radar 9. Air 50X1-HUM Schools: (1) The North Korean Air Force Air Academy. It has courses available under the broad headings of The Flight Course, The Engine Course, The Enlisted Men Training Institute, The Officers Training Institute and an unidentified course area of study that personnel attending the flight course and the engine course must attend. The breakdown of courses provided under the broad headings listed above with the number of hours training given in each is as follows: Flight Course - Principals of the aircraft engine - 70 hours, aircraft characteristics and aerodynamics - 50 hours, aircraft instruments - 50 hours, radio - 50 hours, weapons - 20 hours, communications - 15 hours, general tactics - 50 hours, Air tactics - 60 hours, infantry firing -10 hours, infantry regulations - 40 hours, flight regulations - 15 hours, theory of flight - 70 hours, air firing - 70 hours, navigation - 60 hours, bombing - no time spent in this type training by source. Period of training unknown. Engine course - total period of time spent in this course is three years. Personnel specialize in either weapons, radio, engines or instruments; 50X1-HUM enlisted men training institute - personnel spent six months training in weapons, radio, engines or instruments while there; officers training institute - flight commanding personnel team - engineer team - technician team - staff team. Personnel assigned to this type training take either a short term course of training lasting three to eight months or a long term course lasting three years. Specific time spent in each phase of training unknown. Unidentified course - physics - 20 hours, algebra - 20 hours, Russian language - 10 hours, Korean history - 40 hours, party history - 70 hours philosophy - unknown, public economy - unknown, party politics - 40 hours, Russian Communist party history - 60 hours. The Air Academy also administers flying training and for this purpose a battalion of YAK-18 and MIG-15BIS aircraft are assigned there. it 50X1-HUM took a student pilot eight months to complete flying training but if a backlog of personnel waiting to take training existed a period of three years could elapse between the time a student pilot left class room study and the time he completed flight training. 50X1-HUM in order to alleviate this situation the North Korean Air Force stopped recruiting personnel for flight training. This stoppage has caused a shortage of personnel taking flight training. the 50X1-HUM

North Korean Air Force was trying to solve this problem [redacted] 50X1-HUM
[redacted] (2) North Korean Air Force Division training. Each North Korean Air Force Division administers a three month course to recruits. This training program is not a permanent program. It is organized each time 50X1-HUM
recruits are assigned to a division and dissolved when training is completed.
[redacted] infantry regulations, radio, weapons, instruments, engines, and party politics being included in the subjects taught [redacted] 50X1-HUM
[redacted] (3) Artillery
academy. [redacted] radar subjects are taught at the artillery academy [redacted]

[redacted] The following listed is on Wonsan personnel who have had combat experience. [redacted]
[redacted] 26 Regiment - Commander Lieutenant Colonel, flew MIG-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; Vice Commander, Lieutenant Colonel, flew MIG-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; Vice Commander, Lieutenant Colonel, flew MIG-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; 1st Battalion Commander, Major, flew MIG-15 in combat, flew in combat seven times, time period unknown; First Battalion Commander, Senior Lieutenant, flew MIG-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; Captain, 2d Battalion Commander, flew MIG-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; Captain 2d Battalion Vice Commander, flew a MIG-15 in combat, flew in combat one time, damaged one aircraft. Five six Regiment Commander Lieutenant Colonel, Flew MIG-15 in combat tens of times, credited with shooting down one aircraft; Vice Regimental Commander, Major, flew MIG-15 in combat tens of times, period of time involved unknown; Vice Regimental Commander, Major, flew MIG-15 in combat tens of times, period of time involved unknown; Captain, First Battalion Commander, flew MIG-15 in combat, period of time involved unknown; Major, Second Battalion Commander, flew MIG-15 in combat tens of times, time period involved unknown, shot down three aircraft; Captain, 1st Battalion Vice Commander, flew MIG-15 in combat tens of times, period of time involved unknown, shot down four aircraft and had three of the aircraft he was piloting shot down. [redacted] 50X1-HUM
[redacted] 5. The 56 Regiment at Wonsan is presently emphasizing training in ground support and sea target attack. They are also taking training in air-to-air combat. The 26 Regiment at Wonsan is emphasizing formation flying with 16 experienced pilots also taking air-to-air combat training. Two battalions of the 58 Regiment at Sondok are emphasizing night flying training and the third is emphasizing weather and night flying training. The Fifth Division is emphasizing training in ground or sea forces attack and ground support. 4. Nature of combat offensive training for bombers unknown. For fighters, training in bombing and strafing airfields (the runways in particular), ships, trains, bridges, and convoys in that order of emphasis is taking place. A 15 degree angle of attack was being stressed for the above type targets at the time source defected. 5. [redacted]
types of defensive training in the North Korean Air Force: Defense against 50X1-HUM
interceptors attacking an North Korean Air Force bomber formation, defense against an attacking bomber formation, defense against attacking aircraft while getting airborne and defense against attack while airborne. 6. [redacted]
the average jet fighter, pilot flying time in the North Korean Air Force was 50X1-HUM
7 to 8 hours per month and a maximum of 12 hours per month. Average monthly
jet bomber, pilot flying time unknown. [redacted] they were greater than 50X1-HUM
for jet fighters because bombers had greater range. 8. Pilots in the 56 Regiment at Wonsan average 60 hours each of training flights yearly. The proportionate breakdown of training flights for that unit is unknown. The
26 Regiment at Wonsan [redacted] had the following training schedule for 50X1-HUM
the year: (1) Square angle flight (touch and go landings) - approximately 20 times lasting six minutes each, (2) Formation flying - 6 hours, (3)

[redacted]

50X1-HUM

Bombing - 3 hours, (4) Air-to-air firing (simulated, cameras used) - 7 hours, (5) Navigation - 4 hours, (6) Intercept - 2 hours, (7) Air-to-air combat - 5 hours, (8) Strafing - 2 hours, (9) Company formation flying - 3 hours and (10) Special flights (acrobatics) - 4 hours. 50X1-HUM

9. Air crews receive 20 hours of political indoctrination per month. Length of classes varies between 30 minutes and 2 hours in duration. Total hours of indoctrination per month has decreased since the beginning of the year. At the beginning of this year greater emphasis was placed on the "re-enforcement of combat preparedness" with still greater emphasis occurring after 19 April 1960, when the South Korean political situation developed. At that time personnel were told that the time was near for the re-unification of Korea and North Korea must be prepared to give military aid if south Korea requested it. 10. 50X1-HUM air defense tactics presently being used by the North Korean Air Force against surface vessels and bomber and fighter formations have been used by the North Korean Air Force since it was first originated. North Korean Air Force aircraft are supposed to break both types of formations. In the event a fighter escort is along with a bomber formation intercept aircraft are to give full attention to the bombers, attacking them directly. If enough interceptors are present, diversionary aircraft would attempt to pull the escort away from the bombers thus giving the remaining interceptors an opening for attack. North Korean Air Force utilizes a "ladder" formation for defense against fighter formations. This formation is made up by two elements of the formation flying at the same altitude and one element of the formation flying overhead at a higher altitude. The lower elements of the formation intercept the fighter formation and the upper element keeps alert for aircraft flying the main fighter formation. Aircraft attacking surface vessels approach their target horizontally to the surface of the water at an altitude slightly higher than the top of the vessel being attacked. Bombs are released at a point 50 meters before reaching the target vessel. After releasing bombs the pilot (s) maintain the same altitude, turning out left or right at an unspecified point beyond the target vessel. Aircraft will make another pass if target vessel not destroyed. If the target vessel is close to the aircraft's base it returns at low altitude, if distant, at a high altitude. 11. All 26 Regiment pilots are assigned Kang-Nung Airfield as a target. There are 42 pilots in the regiment. An alternate target was scheduled to be assigned 12. 50X1-HUM it was common knowledge in the North Korean Air Force that bombers had a long range bombing mission all aircraft in the 26 Regiment were to be used in bombing Kang-Nung Airfield. The 26 Regiment had 28 aircraft in it The 56 Regiment at Wonsan and the 58 Regiment is responsible for air defense of the sea area in the 2d Division at Sondok have primary mission of air-to-air combat and the attack of sea targets respectively in that order. The 58 Regiment is responsible for air defense of the sea area in the 2d Division area of responsibility. The 56 Regiment is responsible for air defense of the area south of Wonsan. The 26 Regiment is responsible for air defense of the area north of Wonsan. 13. 50X1-HUM no recovery is planned for home bases because pilots are instructed to return to a pre-designated alternate airfield in the event their home base is destroyed. In training flights Wonsan pilots have been instructed to return to either Sunchon or Pukchang Airfield if Wonsan is destroyed. 14. 50X1-HUM one fuel storage area and one weapons storage area. Both storage areas

were at Wonsan Airfield. Fuel storage area contains aircraft and vehicle fuel and lubricants. The aircraft fuel is called T-1 and is used by all jets in North Korean Air Force. 25X1
with exception to three aircraft fuel storage tanks located on the 25X1
surface all storage tanks are subsurface. The weapons storage area contains 50, 100, and 250 kilograms and 7.62 mm, 23 mm, and 37 mm guns and ammunition.
North Korean 25X1
Air Force prop driven aircraft use B-70 type fuel, none is stored at target.
15. Prior to the standdown cited previously the last standdown occured during April 1960 and was approximately 3 days in duration. The reason for this standdown was that an aircraft in the 1st Division crashed. The accident was attributed to pilot error. He lost altitude too quickly in making his letdown and as a result crashed into a dike. The recent standdown was caused by an aircraft from the 58 Regiment at Sondok crashing into a mountain. The crash occurred in May 1960 and was attributed to two causes: (1) Poor prior ground control approach training for the pilot, and (2) Poor conduct on the 50X1-HUM
part of the ground control approach operator. He released control of the aircraft to the pilot without getting him clear of cloud cover.
that North Korean Air Force standdowns occur after every aircraft accident. 50X1-HUM
Purpose of the standdowns is to thoroughly inspect all aircraft in the North Korean Air Force. The pilot of the plane that crashed during May 1960 had just returned from leave and had taken the aircraft up for an inspection flight.
16. higher ranking pilots than the average were involved in most North Korean Air Force aircraft accidents. The principal reason for this being that higher ranking pilots, because of their rank, can avoid 50X1-HUM
following a North Korean Air Force operational procedure of briefing all pilots on flight instructions and conditions prior to take-off.

any time large scale manuevers are held in South Korea a standdown for the purpose of alert occurs. Length of such standdowns depend on the length assigned to his battalion.

24. Interceptor pilots are restricted from firing on an aircraft without the approval of division control center or a higher headquarters. 25. Aircraft usually did not fly when cloud cover was below three hundred meters in altitude or visibility was less than two kilometers. Each North Korean Air Force airfield has a varying number of local restricted flying areas that are reserved for use by special flights (acrobatics) and air-to-air combat training flights. Wonsan has five such restricted areas. They range in size from 15 kilometers times 20 kilometers for acrobatic flight training areas to 30 kilometers times 30 kilometers for air-to-air combat training flights. Wonsan local restricted flying areas are at the following distances and headings from the airfield: (1) 22 kilometers distance at 286 degrees heading (2) 20 kilometers distance at 206 degrees heading, (3) 20 kilometers distance at 124 degrees heading, (4) 22 kilometers distance at 024 degrees heading, and (5) unknown heading east at 30 kilometers distance. In addition to these local area restrictions the demilitarized zone, the China/North Korea border, the U.S.S.R./North Korea border, the Pyongyang City area, the Supung Power Plant area, the Hamhung fertilizer plant, and the Chongjin Power Plant area are restricted flying areas. During the period when the North Korean Air Force Air Academy was located at Yenchi, China, North 50X1-HUM
Korean Air Force aircraft were permitted to fly along Chinese side of the China/North Korea border at the Tumen river section of the border

the reason North Korean Air Force aircraft were not permitted to fly over the Hamhung fertilizer factory was because the North Korean Air Force did not want to risk an aircraft accident in which the aircraft crashed into the factory.

P-4M or P-5M) while it was flying over the sea of Japan was made by two MIG-15BIS based at Wonsan Airfield. The pilots were Captain KIM, Byong Hyon and Jr. Lt YI, Sok Mun. The latter pilot was promoted as a result of this action. The reason for the attack was that the P-4M was flying along the North Korean coastline and a standing directive directed that all aircraft flying along the coastline would be intercepted. Reason for the directive is that aireraft flying along the coastline are collecting intelligence information about the coastline. [redacted] the P-4M was intercepted 70 to 80 50X1-HUM kilometers off the North Korean coast at a 500 meter altitude. The action was not terminated until the P-4M had reached a distance of 150 kilometers out from the coast. [redacted] when the CGI operator notified the interce 50X1-HUM pilots that the P-4M should be in sight they had their aircraft at an 8,000 meter altitude and as a result could not see the P-4M until they dived down to a lower altitude. When they dove to a lower altitude radio contact with the control center was lost and messages had to be relayed by way of two other alert aircraft that had been sent up to altitude. Radar surveillance of the P-4M was not affected by low altitude. The original plan of attack was to have the interceptors attack simultaneously from either side of the P-4M but fear of collision caused the pilots to attack singly in trail. When the P-4M was sighted by interceptors they identified it as a B-26 and made their gun sight settings for that type aircraft. This identification error caused 50X1-HUM rounds fired in their initial bursts to fall short of the target. The North Korean Air Force Commander, Colonel General CH'AE Kwang, reprimanded the pilots for not succeeding in shooting down the aircraft. 27. [redacted]

[redacted]

Attitude towards foreign flights over either North Korea, Communist China, or Soviet Far East territory is to either shoot the aircraft down or force it to land. The North Korean policy in relation to aircraft flying south of the DMZ is to attempt luring them into North Korean territory in pursuit of North Korean Air Force aircraft and to then either shoot them down or force them to land if circumstances permit. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] North Korean newspapers published news stories about the B-47 that

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was shot down recently [redacted] the aircraft that shot the B-47 down was super-sonic. The North Korean newspapers claimed the B-47 had penetrated deep into Soviet territory. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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50X1-HUM

the fuel capacity without drop-tanks

1,410 liters.

the amount of fuel consumed in climbing to 3,000 meters and flying 185 kilometers

50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM

Approximately 1,000 liters, which left about 300 liters to spare (at 550 kph).

As the K-50 runway is only 1,400 meters long, the aircraft will be barely able to get airborne after running the entire length of the airfield. It may be possible to shorten the take-off distance by lowering the wing flaps 20 degrees; however

the length of the runway at Wonsan Airfield

2,000 meters.

the runway temperature at Wonsan Airfield at time of take-off

Approximately 30 degrees centigrade.

the runway temperature

is not so important in take-off as it is in landing, because of the horizontal expansion of one (1) meter.

the take-off distance at Wonsan today

50X1-HUM

slightly more than 1,000 meters.

it was with a full fuel load.

Although the gauge shows only up to 1,050 liters, the actual fuel supply is 1,410 liters. Fueling is made until it reaches 30mm from the top of the filter in the fuel cap. The fuel gauge functions from 1,050 liters.

the designation of the fuel

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is called T-1. It is a petroleum fuel.

the fuel system

is capable of a maximum of 11,560 rpm. The maximum can be obtained by turning the switch "KPAP" to the left of the forward instrument panel to "on".

50X1-HUM

the engine started

By ground power equipment (24V).

There is a plug located on the fuselage behing the wing. The connection on the aircraft is male and that on the ground power equipment is female.

INDICATIONS OF WARLIKE INTENT

1. Organization Readjustments in NKAF: The North Korean Air Force has carried out a number of organizational changes to avoid complexity of the chain of command, expedite mobilization in case of emergency, and to overcome difficulties encountered by the inadequacy of equipment. Thus, the 4th Bomber Division, which failed to secure the authorized T/E strength of IL-28s and therefore could not continue to operate as a full-strength division, was reorganized into the 36th Regiment, directly subordinate to the North Korean Air Command around last may. Also, the Civil Aviation Bureau under the Ministry of Transportation was made subordinate to the Air Command early in 1960, and the entire complement of five (5) LI-2s was transferred to the Air Force, probably with a view to increase the logistical and military transport capability of the Air Force.

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the curriculum and flight training courses of the North Korean Air Officer Academy have been reorganized to place more emphasis on flying exercises.

In March 1958, a plenary meeting of the North Korean Labor Party was convened to discuss reinforceing the system of centralization and to re-align the central control system more in line with the requirements of reality, and as a result, the Political Department in each unit of the North Korean Armed Forces was reorganized as the Party Committee, with radically expanded functions. Under the new system, operational and management plans for each unit are to be worked out by the unit personnel themselves, subject to approval by higher headquarters prior to implementation.

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this Party Committee has authority to handle matters even relative to operations, logistics and personnel administration.

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General principles are debated by Party Committee members elected by all the subordinate units, and their recommendations are submitted to higher headquarters for approval. All basic decisions are taken by higher headquarters, except in emergencies when such matters are entrusted to the discretion of the sub-unit commanders, subject however, to subsequent approval by the Party Committee.

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2. Changes in Equipment: Early in 1959, the entire 57th Regiment of the 3rd Division was converted to MIG-17s, and the equipping of the 60th Regiment, 1st Division (stationed at Sunch'on) with MIG-19s planned within 1960. Early in August 1960, the 60th Regiment was said to be undergoing instructions preliminary to conversion of MIG-19s.

[redacted] the "basic policy" of the North Korean Air Force [redacted] utilizing MIG-15BIS and MIG-17 type aircraft for interception purposes, and to introduce new MIG-19s to replace older MIG-17s for purposes of pursuit and attack.

[redacted] due to certain unknown shortcomings in the performance of MIG-19s, the conversion to MIG-19s was to be suspended in favor of the newer MIG-21s [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] the North Korean Air Force is devoting much of its effort and attention to modernization of aircraft equipment, and this trend has been increasingly evident since early in 1959. 50X1-HUM

3. Unit Shifts from Manchuria to North Korea: [redacted] the North Korean Air Force transferred a number of units from Manchuria into North Korea. Involved in the shift were the entire personnel and equipment of the 4th Division and the Air Officer Academy. The latter was ited at Ch'ongjin, Hamgyong Province, and was assigned a number of fighters on alert to harmonize the air disposition in the Northeast area. 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

Toksan Airfield was newly built (ground work completed in March 1957), to accomodate the 26th Regiment, 2nd Division; however, for unknown reasons, the actual shift of the unit itself was never carried out. [redacted] changes of sectors between the I and II Corps. North Korean Army [redacted] 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

4. Personnel Reshuffle: [redacted] over 80 per cent of the North Korean Air Force officers above the rank of Regimental Commander were purged (discharged) as anti-Party elements as part of a move aimed at strengthening the centralization of government control and preparation for war. In this purge were involved three general officers, including WANG, Ryon and HO, Min Kuk. After this purge [redacted] a propaganda drive was started calling this purge a "step forward" toward war preparedness.

5. Training: Intensive training is being continued in oversea flights, ground attacks, and joint air-ground maneuvers. After the April Revolution in South Korea, training activities became more intensified. The North Korean Air Force is regarding all sides of North Korean territories as possible approaches for attack by the United Nations air forces.

6. Joint Russo-Chinese-North Korean Maneuver: Unknown numbers of Russian, Communist Chinese and North Korean ground forces conducted a joint exercise in what was called a "Command Staff Joint Exercise". The maneuver was conducted in Manchuria for approximately 15 days [redacted] but it was unknown whether air forces also participated in it. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] In case of emergency, the so-called Red Guards (a kind or militia reserve) were organized [redacted] This organization conducts tactical and 50X1-HUM

[redacted]

combat training several hours each week. As of August 1960, Red Guards in the cities (Wonsan and else where) were fully equipped with basic infantry weapons, but in the village Red Guards, only part of the members were thus armed. The Red Guards are organized in parallel with the regular armed forces, and are applied to the same combat tactics.

7. Economic Mobilization: Payment of taxes in-kind is one of the continued basic policies of the North Korean regime. The amount of such taxes was somewhat increased and the compulsory supply of scrap metals was continued as ever. North Korea started a propaganda drive compelling the populace to increase their productive output for the ostensible purpose of "extending relief" to the South Korean residents, and the puppet regime also stepped up its production boost drive. It also plans to implement a new seven-year people's economy drive, starting in 1961. 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

8. Political Changes: no governmental reshuffles except for limited reshuffles in the North Korean Cabinet. The purge of Provincial Party cadres touched off a tornado of terror throughout North Korea. The purpose of this purge was believed to be the strengthening of control by KIM, Il Song and the undesireable elements were purged as "good-for-nothings". In conjunction with the purge, the North Korean regime started an intensive propaganda drive to urge the populace to practice austerity and sacrifice. 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

The hidden purpose of the austerity and productivity drive, ostensibly aimed to build up surplus stockpiles to help the South Korean people, was believed to be the building up of war stockpiles.

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8. Status of North Korean Air Force

a. T-1 (equivalent of JP-4) is supplied in annual allotments, subject to further requisition in case of shortage. For approximately 15 days during the summer , training had to be interrupted due to exhaustion of fuel stocks.

b. T-1 supply was generally considered adequate, but effort is being made for fuel conservation. Failure to accomplish flight missions becomes a subject for reprimand for "waste of fuel".

c. North Korean Air Force aircraft was grounded after a MIG-17 of the 58th Regiment crashed on the mountainside during diving practice. Flying was suspended for approximately one week after the accident

The entire period of flight suspension, following the MIG-17 crash was devoted to technical instruction.

d. four (4) fighters were kept on alert, with two (2) on cockpit alert and the other two (2) on strip alert, while two (2) additional squadrons were in stand-by. (Until last year, stand-by consisted of either one (1) squadron or one (1) flight) At night, two (2) MIG-17 interceptors (referred to as PF were put on alert at Sandok Airfield. the 50X1-HUM year 1960 was designated by the North Korean Air Force as the "Year of Combat Readiness".

e. There was a complete absence of training flights 50X1-HUM owing to the clean-up and policing in preparation for the August 15 50X1-HUM celebrations. In the 5th Division (based at Kaeach'on and Kusong) a ground smash-up involving a MIG-15BIS took place and a training program of one (1) week's duration was initiated 50X1-HUM

f. four [illegible] and 11 MIG-15BIS of the 26th 50X1-HUM Regiment conducted a training [illegible] starting at 0730.

g. Disposition of North Korean Air Force Units:

(1) North Korean Air Force Headquarters: Halfway between Mirim and Sandong (referred to as 564th Air Unit).

(2) 1st Division - 60th Regiment: Sunch'on (conversion to MIG-19s planned)

59th Regiment: Pukch'ang

25th Regiment: Sunch'on

(3) 2nd Division: Headquarters: Sandok (884th Air Unit)

58th Regiment: Sandok

26th Regiment: Wonsan (36875th Air Unit)

56th Regiment: Wonsan

(4) 3rd Division: Headquarters: Hwangju

57th Regiment: Mirim

61st Regiment: Hwangju

27th Regiment: Yonggang

(5) 4th Division: Headquarters: Deactivated early in 1960

36th Independent Regiment: Uiju

24th Reconnaissance Regiment: Sunan

(6) 5th Division: Headquarters: Kaech'on

54th Regiment: Kusong

55th Regiment: Kaech'on

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(7) Command Squadron: Mirim

(8) Air Force Academy located at Ch'ongjin (moved from Yenchi in Manchuria in July 1959) with a branch school at Hoemun.

h. North Korean Air Force Personalities:

(1) Commanding General: Lt Gen CHOE, Kwang - former Superintendent, North Korean Army University - assumed command 24 October 1958.

(2) Deputy Commanding General (Political): Maj Gen CHOE, Chong Kon, younger brother of CHOE, Yong Kon, former propaganda chief of the party Central Committee.

(3) Deputy Command General (Flying): Vacant

(4) Deputy Commanding General (Technical): Maj Gen KIM, Ung Soo

(5) Commander, 2nd Division: Senior Colonel AN, Yong Kook

(6) Commander, 3rd Division: Colonel CHOE, Ki Hyung

(7) Commander, Command Squadron: Senior Colonel PAK, Chong Sik

(8) Superintendent, Air Academy: Senior Colonel HAN, Tae Sook

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50X1-HUM